

OUTLINE FOR BRIEFING MR. TRUMAN

INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

August 19, 1958

1. Last briefing two weeks ago tomorrow -- on July 30.

Covered developments through Iraqi coup., Lebanon landings and Khrushchev's proposal for a summit meeting on the Middle East to include India. Geneva suggested as site but USA or Moscow acceptable. If New York City difficult for security reasons, Moscow OK where he could guarantee security. *[Moscow riots]*

2. US and Great Britain countered that Mid-East matter was before the proper forum in UN and should not be removed from it. *Moscow not acceptable.*

3. DeGaulle for variety of reasons -- not desiring get into broad discussion Arab problems in UN because of Algeria and disliking idea of UN debate view Constitution and other

DIA review(s) completed.

Constitution

keeping him in Europe, presented Geneva. ^{US}
agreed accept Geneva but still under UN auspices
Then
agreed that this would be the agreed solution.

USSR

then considerable delay-unusual at this stage of
correspondence where Soviet had been very prompt.

4. Reason: Khrushchev trip to Peiping, leaving August 1
returning August 4.

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Matter kept entirely

secret Moscow and Peiping until issuance of Khrushchev-

Mao communique on August 3.). We believe Mao put pressure

on Khrushchev for visit Peiping, considered ^{him} ~~it~~ self neglected
in this entire exchange and probably annoyed at Khrushchev's
inclusion Nehru.

*Debate
in intell.
community
on degree
of influence*

Upon return Moscow Khrushchev shifted tactics and
insisted matter be referred General Assembly. There was
already pending from earlier Security Council debates two

resolutions, first, USA resolution and subsequently USSR resolution for reference to General Assembly. US-UK quickly accepted General Assembly formula. France acquiesced without enthusiasm.

Khrushchev, however, also insisted^{ing} that there be ~~early~~ summit conference to deal with world problems.

5. Meanwhile Chicom in order to bring themselves into the picture made threatening moves, particularly in the Taiwan Straits area and have brought down to airfields opposite Formosa considerable number of modern fighter planes -- MIG-17's. We do not believe any early all out attack on Quemoy Matsu contemplated as no sign of land or naval build-up in area. However, ~~considerable~~ possible Chicom may try to starve out off-shore islands by seizing air control of Taiwan Straits and threatening the provisioning of roughly 100,000 Chinat troops on Quemoy and Matsu.

First reaction Chiang Kai-Shek and Chinat leaders was somewhat panicky. Strong messages to USA from them both for the buildup of Chinat military forces, particularly air, and desire for more clear-cut assurances regarding US position respecting off-shore islands.

6. Now turning back to Middle East.

A. Lebanon.

Internal situation developing fairly satisfactorily.

No incidents involving American forces. Chehab election generally well received though important to remember that Chehab probably neutralist at heart and acceptable to Nasr as he told us sometime ago. Chehab is content to have American troops remain at least until he is ~~xxx~~ installed as President.

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In agreement with President Chamoun and President
Elect Chehab, American forces Lebanon will be shortly reduced
by withdrawal of a Marine Battalion of about 1500 troops.
Reembarkation from one of beaches near Beirut will start at
7:00 o'clock tomorrow, Wednesday morning.

B. Jordan.

Situation Jordan remains very critical. General
impression that Hussein days are numbered leading to defections.

C. Israel.

Ben Gurion seriously disturbed over consequences of possible breakup of Jordan, [and we also fearful of this, ^{as} ~~that~~ it might spark Near East war with great temptation on Israel to re-occupy up to Jordan, ^{The} ~~but~~ still deterred from doing so because of refugee problem.

D. Iraq.

New government now recognized by practically everybody including USA. Having growing pains due administrative incompetence. Influx Egyptian advisors and strong Soviet Ambassador. Colonel Aref/^{Vice Prime Minister,} emerging as the rabble-rouser and potential Nasr.

E. Kuwait.

Generally endeavoring to propitiate Nasr, ^{but} at the same time keep oil revenues. We disturbed about security situation there but ruler seems to be more ^{confident} ~~competent~~ than we in loyalty his security forces.

F. Saudi Arabia.

Egyptian Chief of Staff Amer, has visited S.A., conferred Saud and particularly Faysal and probably arranged.

for the return of the Egyptian Military Mission which Saud had thrown out a few months ago.

Faysal planning early trip to Cairo where he will probably make a deal with Nasr for some loose confederation with the UAR, hoping to preserve dynasty and at same time preserve at least bulk of oil revenue.

G. Egypt.

Murphy had four hour talk with Nasr after being kept waiting a whole day because of Nasr's irritation at belief that USA reintroducing in General Assembly resolution to condemn Egypt for indirect aggression. Conversation covered the water front but did not really produce anything particularly new.

Nasr gone on vacation.

H. Situation Sudan, Libya still critical and two possible coups threaten in Sudan -- one by present pro-West government to seize complete authority; the other by pro-Egyptian group to throw out pro-West government.

I. Ethiopia.

Ethiopia disturbed by developments, particularly by

Sudan situation

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J. Tunis.

Bourgiba has made outstanding pro-West speech but so pro-West that it has alarmed Algerian rebels FLN, who have strong forces within Tunis, and has even threatened Bourgiba's support in his own country.

K. Morocco.

Moroccan government would like to have us in principle
give up our bases but would ^{secretly} agree to our staying on for a con-
siderable time. *5-10 years under new contract.* Present government threatened by Leftist forces.

L. Iran.

Shah is definitely worried about possibility of Iraq-
type coup and our ^{military} ~~military~~ attaches are generally agreed that
a well organized coup might well find army support as its loyalty
to the Shah not fully assured. A member of the Iranian UN
delegation recently told our delegation that in absence of
wide-spread reforms, a revolution in Iran was inevitable.

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This gives general picture of Mid-East situation and background to UN Assembly debates, and the President's address of which I have a draft to show you.

Allen W. Dulles